Abstract. Possibility measures and conditional possibility measures are given a behavioural interpretation as marginal betting rates against events. Under this interpretation, possibility measures should satisfy two consistency criteria, known as`avoiding sure loss' and`coherence'. We survey the rules that have been proposed for de ning conditional possibilities and investigate which of them satisfy our consistency criteria in two situations of practical interest. Only two of these rules satisfy the criteria in both cases studied, and the conditional possibilities produced by these rules are highly uninformative. We introduce a new rule that is more informative and is also coherent in both cases.
Introduction
When the term`possibility measure' was coined by Zadeh 29] for what is essentially a supremum preserving set function, the signi cance of this type of set function had already been recognised in a number of other contexts 21, 22, 23] . These set functions are especially simple to work with because they can be completely characterised by point functions. In this respect, they are similar to probability measures.
Consider a possibility space , which is a non-empty set of possible states of the world. In this paper we assume that is nite. A possibility measure P on is a function, de ned on the power set of and taking values in the real unit interval 0; 1], such that P(A B) = maxfP(A); P (B)g, for all A and B . De ne the function : ! 0; 1], such that (!) = P(f!g), ! 2 . The point function then completely determines the set function P, since for any A , P(A) = maxf (!): ! 2 Ag. It is called the possibility distribution of P, and it plays a similar role to a probability mass or density function.
discriminating between the proposed conditioning rules according to whether they satisfy the criteria 1 . We also propose a new conditioning rule which appears to be superior to the others in several ways. We shall be concerned with conditioning on variables rather than events, but the ideas of the paper apply equally well to the latter type of conditioning. To x the notation, consider two variables X and Y . Let X and Y denote their respective sets of possible values. We assume that X and Y are both nite: the coherence conditions are more complicated, and more controversial, for in nite spaces. Write ( ; ) for the unconditional possibility distribution, (x) and (y) for the marginal possibilities 2 , and ( jx) and ( jy) for the conditional possibility distributions. Let P(A) = maxf (x; y): (x; y) 2 Ag for non-empty A X Y P (Bjy) = maxf (xjy): x 2 Bg for non-empty B X, y 2 Y P (Cjx) = maxf (yjx): y 2 Cg for non-empty C Y, x 2 X with P(;) = P (;jy) = P (;jx) = 0, denote the upper probability measures or possibility measures generated by the possibility distributions ( ; ), ( jy) and ( jx). The marginal distributions are given by P(X fyg) = maxf (u; y): u 2 Xg = (y) P(fxg Y) = maxf (x; v): v 2 Yg = (x):
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we explain and discuss the behavioural interpretation of both unconditional and conditional possibility measures. In Sections 3 and 4, we introduce and de ne the consistency criteria of normality, avoiding sure loss and coherence, and we argue that it is indeed reasonable to impose them if we want our possibilistic models to re ect rational behaviour. We nd that normality and avoiding sure loss are very easily satis ed in the context of possibility measures. The criterion of coherence is given more attention in Sections 5 and 6, where it is also used to discriminate between the various conditioning rules extant in the literature.
The de nitions of these rules are listed below, together with a short discussion of their backgrounds. A more detailed overview and discussion can be found in 5]. It will be assumed here that the joint distribution ( ; ) is normal, i.e. that maxf (x; y): (x; y) 2 X Yg = 1. 1.1. Zadeh's rule. Zadeh was the rst to consider conditioning for possibility measures 29] . His rule is very simple, and consists in equating conditional degrees of possibility with unconditional ones: ZA (xjy) = (x; y); x 2 X; y 2 Y: It has the disadvantage that it may produce unnormalised conditional possibility distributions ZA ( jy) , even when the joint distribution is normal. Indeed, for any y 2 Y, ZA ( jy) is unnormalised whenever the marginal (y) < 1! 1.2. Hisdal's equation. Inspired by Bayes' rule, which can be written as P(x; y) = P(xjy)P(y), Hisdal 16] proposed to de ne conditional possibilities using the following equation relating the conditional, marginal and joint distributions: (x; y) = minf (xjy); (y)g; x 2 X; y 2 Y: (1) Whereas Bayes' rule leads to a unique value P(x; y)=P(y) for the conditional probability P(xjy) whenever P(y) > 0, Hisdal's equation is much less restrictive. It has a unique solution ( jy) only if (y) = 1. All its solutions are given by: (2) 1 The method used in this paper could be applied more generally to evaluate other kinds of rules for combining or modifying possibility distributions, by investigating whether the possibility distributions produced by the rules are coherent with the initial distributions. See pp. 45{46 of 25] for more details. 2 We do not distinguish in notation between the marginal possibility distributions for X and Y . It will at all times be clear from the context which marginal is intended.
An arbitrary solution ( jy) of (1) need not be normal, as is exempli ed by the fact that Zadeh's rule picks out the smallest solution. There are a number of other conditioning rules which yield particular normal solutions to Hisdal's equation. We will consider the rules proposed by Ramer and by Dubois and Prade.
1.3. Ramer's rule. For a given y in Y, Hisdal' s equation may have more than one solution (xjy) only for those x 2 X which maximise ( ; y), i.e. which satisfy (x; y) = (y). Ramer's rule 18] consists in picking one x o such that (x o ; y) = (y), letting (x o jy) = 1, and (xjy) = (x; y) for all other x in X. It produces normal ( jy), but it has the disadvantage of requiring an arbitrary choice whenever there is more than one x that maximises ( ; y). if (y) = 0: Strictly, Dempster's rule does not determine DE (xjy) when (y) = 0, but in that case we adopt the least committal value DE (xjy) = 1. This choice has no e ect on the coherence properties of Dempster's rule.
Conditional possibility distributions DE ( jy), y 2 Y, are always normal. 1.6. Renormalised Hisdal rules. As we have seen in Section 1.2, an arbitrary solution ( jy) of Hisdal's equation need not be normal. We can make it normal by dividing it by its highest value (y) = maxf (xjy): x 2 Xg, which according to (2) is assumed in an x which maximises ( ; y), i.e. (x; y) = (y). Consequently (y) (y) 1. If we agree to treat all x which maximise ( ; y) in the same way,
i.e. give them the same value of (xjy) = (y), then the renormalised conditional possibility distribution becomes, for x 2 X: the Dubois-Prade rule for = 1. In the sense described above, these intermediate rules produce the renormalised versions of the (not necessarily normal) solutions to Hisdal's equation. They will therefore be called renormalised Hisdal rules. 3 Dempster's rule yields conditional possibility distributions which dominate the ones given by the Dubois-Prade rule: DP (xjy) DE (xjy) for all x 1.7. Nguyen's rule. In the rule proposed by Nguyen 17] , (xjy) depends on (x) as well as on (y) and (x; (1) . This leads to the following relation between the conditional, marginal and joint distributions: (x; y) = T( (xjy); (y)); x 2 X; y 2 Y; (3) where T is a triangular norm 19, 20] , i.e. an non-decreasing, commutative and associative binary operator on the real unit interval 0; 1], with neutral element 1 and absorbing element 0. There may in general be more than one value of (xjy) which satis es (3) for given (x; y) and (y). As in the special case of the Dubois-Prade conditioning rule (Section 1.4), it therefore seems reasonable to let (xjy) be the greatest (least informative, least speci c) solution of (3) . Such a solution is guaranteed to exist only if T is continuous. This yields the Dubois-Prade rule for the choice T = min, and Dempster's rule if we let T be the (algebraic) product.
In recent work, De Baets et al. 1, 2] have argued that T should furthermore be strict, i.e. be Archimedean and have strictly increasing partial mappings. This e ectively restricts T to triangular norms which are related to the (algebraic) product in the following way: T = T , where is an order With any such , we may therefore associate a conditioning rule as follows:
(xjy) = The conditional distributions NE ( jy) are always normal. Of course NE (yjx) is de ned by analogous formulae, with (y) replaced by (x) = P(cofxg Y) = maxf (u): u 2 X; u 6 = xg.
There are several ways of deriving the formulae for natural extension. Firstly, we will show in Section 5 that NE ( jy) is the largest (or least informative) conditional possibility distribution that is coherent with the joint distribution ( ; ). A second derivation is based on the behavioural interpretation of P(A) as a marginally acceptable rate for betting against A, as explained more in detail in Section 2: it can be shown that P NE (Bjy) = maxf NE (xjy): x 2 Bg is the lowest conditional betting rate that can be constructed by combining marginally acceptable unconditional bets:
for some non-negative function de ned on the power set of X Yg; or in other words, the natural extension P NE (Bjy) is the in mum value of such that the reward from a bet against B conditional on y at betting rate (which is the left-hand side of the inequality) is everywhere at least as large as a positive linear combination of marginally acceptable unconditional gambles. The idea here is that we can be forced to accept the gamble on the right-hand side (or a gamble arbitrarily close to it) by betting against each event A at the marginally acceptable rate (or arbitrarily close to it), and hence we should be willing to accept the gamble on the left-hand side, which is equivalent to betting against B conditional on y at rate . In this sense, the natural extension NE ( jy) models the conditional betting behaviour that is entailed by the joint distribution ( ; ).
Thirdly, NE ( jy) can be derived as the upper envelope of all conditional probability measures P( jy) which are consistent with some joint probability measure that is dominated by the possibility measure P, where P(A) = maxf (x; y): (x; y) 2 Ag. Formally, let P be the set of all probability measures on X Y, and let M be the set of all probability measures dominated by P: M = fP : P 2 P, P(A) P(A) for every A X Yg: If (y) < 1 then P(X fyg) > 0 for each P in M, and we may apply Bayes' rule to obtain the conditional probability P(Bjy) = P(B fyg)=P(X fyg), for any B X. By taking the supremum over M, we obtain the upper envelope of the conditional probability measures, P NE (Bjy) = supfP(Bjy): P 2 Mg, for all B X. If (y) = 1 then there is P in M for which P(X fyg) = 0, and every conditional probability measure P( jy) is consistent with such a P since Bayes' rule is vacuous. The upper envelope of all these conditional probability measures is the vacuous upper probability P NE (Bjy) = 1 if B X and B 6 = ;. We will show, in the Corollary to Theorem 5, that P NE ( jy) is the possibility measure which has possibility distribution NE ( jy).
The conditional distributions produced by natural extension dominate those produced by all the other rules considered in this paper, and indeed they are usually vacuous since NE (xjy) = 1 unless (y) < 1. There can be at most one y 2 Y such that (y) < 1, namely if y is the unique modal value (or mode) of the marginal possibility distribution ( ) of Y , i.e. the only value of v in Y such that (v) = 1. If ( ) is plurimodal, i.e. if it has more than one mode, then NE (xjy) = 1 for all x 2 X and y 2 Y and conditioning by natural extension is completely uninformative.
1.10. Regular extension. The process of natural extension can be modi ed slightly to produce conditional possibility distributions which are slightly more informative. If (y) > 0, there are P in M such that P(X fyg) > 0, and we de ne the regular extension as in 24, Appendix J]: P RE (Bjy) = supfP(Bjy): P 2 M; P(X fyg) > 0g for all B X: (The natural extension is given by the same formula in the special case where (y) < 1.) If (y) = 0 then P(X fyg) = 0 for all P in M and we let P RE ( jy) be the vacuous upper probability. This process of regular extension again produces P RE ( jy) otherwise: For possibility distributions, the natural extension is almost the same as the regular extension; they disagree only when (y) = 1 and (y) > (x; y) = 0, in which case NE (xjy) = 1 and RE (xjy) = 0.
1.11. Harmonic mean rule. We will see that, of the rules de ned so far, only Dempster's rule (and some of its transforms) and natural (or regular) extension are coherent in the simplest situation. However, both rules have defects: Dempster's rule produces values DE (xjy) that are too small to be coherent in more complicated situations, whereas natural (or regular) extension produces values NE (xjy) that are usually too large to be useful. This suggests a new rule which takes (xjy) to be some kind of average of DE (xjy) and NE (xjy). It turns out that the harmonic mean is a suitable average; the new values HM (xjy) are usually non-vacuous and are coherent in both problems we study.
The harmonic mean rule produces the conditional possibilities:
HM (xjy) = Of the ve cases in the preceding formulae, the last two will be relatively infrequent because they can occur for at most one y in Y (which must satisfy (y) < 1), and the third case is the most common nontrivial case. The formulae would not change if we de ned HM (xjy) to be the harmonic mean of DE (xjy) and RE (xjy), i.e. if we replaced natural extension by regular extension, as the two disagree only when DE (xjy) = 0, which implies HM (xjy) = 0 irrespective of whether natural or regular extension is used. Of course HM (yjx) is de ned by analogous formulae, with (y) replaced by (x) and (y) replaced by (x) .
As expected, DE (xjy) HM (xjy) RE (xjy) NE (xjy) for all x 2 X and y 2 Y, and it follows that HM ( jy) is always a normal possibility distribution. Unlike natural extension, the harmonic mean rule has the non-vacuity property: if (x; y) < (y) then HM (xjy) < 1. Other properties of the rule are that HM (xjy) is a continuous function of (x; y), (y) and (y), it is a non-decreasing function of (x; y) (and strictly increasing if 0 < (x; y) < (y)), it is non-increasing in (y), and it is non-decreasing in (y).
Behavioural interpretation of possibility measures
We believe that, in order to build a useful theory of possibility, it is necessary to begin with a speci c interpretation of degrees of possibility. To understand the practical meaning of possibility measures, i.e. how they should be used in practical reasoning, we need a behavioural interpretation that relates possibility measures to decisions and actions. Provided the joint possibility distribution ( ; ) is normal, the corresponding possibility measure P is a coherent upper probability measure. It is therefore natural to adopt the behavioural interpretation of upper probabilities. Essentially, upper probabilities are marginally acceptable rates for betting against an event. 4 . (By marginally acceptable we mean that G(A) + " is acceptable for any strictly positive ".) In other words, P(A) is an in mum acceptable betting rate for betting against A.
The value P(A) of a possibility measure is usually called the`degree of possibility' or`degree of plausibility' of A. This terminology is consistent with the behavioural interpretation. Intuitively, an event is plausible to the extent that we would not bet against it; and the less we are inclined to bet against an event, the closer to one should be the in mum acceptable betting rate. In the extreme case where an event A is fully plausible, there is no reason to bet against it at any odds and the only acceptable betting rate is P(A) = 1.
Next consider the behavioural interpretation of conditional possibility measures. Suppose that a conditioning rule is used to calculate a conditional degree of possibility P (Bjy) = maxf (xjy): x 
Unnormalised possibility distributions
Under the behavioural interpretation, it is reasonable to require that the conditional possibility distributions ( jy) and ( jx), as well as the joint distribution ( ; ), should be normal possibility distributions. If the joint distribution is not normal then P(X Y) = maxf (x; y): (x; y) 2 X Yg < 1, which means (under the behavioural interpretation of P) that we are willing to bet against the sure event X Y at a betting rate smaller than one, which is certain to result in a loss. Formally, an unnormalised possibility distribution ( ; ) fails to avoid sure loss in the sense of Section 4. It is therefore necessary for ( ; ) to be normal.
To argue that the conditional possibility distributions ( jy) should also be normal, we need to consider their two interpretations. Under the updating interpretation, ( jy) is the unconditional possibility distribution that we would adopt if we learned only that Y = y. Whatever value of Y is observed, we want the new possibility distribution to avoid sure loss, and this implies that ( jy) must be normal for all y 2 Y.
Under the contingent interpretation, suppose that ( jy) is not normal for some y 2 Y, so that P (X jy) = maxf (xjy): x 2 Xg < 1. Then a bet against the sure event X contingent on Y = y, at any betting rate such that P (X jy) < < 1, is acceptable. This bet has net reward I X fyg ? I X Y ] = ?(1 ? )I X fyg . If Y = y then the bet is certain to produce a loss of 1 ? , and otherwise the bet is called o . Such an unfavourable bet should not be acceptable, and again this implies that ( jy) must be normal for all y 2 Y.
Technical Remark 1. The preceding bet does not produce a`sure loss' in the sense of Section 4, as it is not certain that Y = y. However, it does violate the slightly stronger consistency condition in 28] and the criterion of`separate coherence' in 24, Section 6.2], each of which implies normality of ( jy) for all y 2 Y. The criterion of avoiding sure loss in Section 4 implies normality of ( ; ), and it also implies normality of ( jy) in the special case where (y) = P(X cofyg) < 1. The coherence criterion in Section 4 implies normality of ( jy) under the weaker assumption that (y) > 0. (Normality of ( jy) is not necessary for coherence when (y) = 0, but this case has little practical signi cance as values y with (y) = 0 are`not possible'.)
We will therefore require that the joint and conditional possibility distributions ( ; ), ( jy), and ( jx) are always normal. This is equivalent to the requirement that each of the corresponding possibility measures P, P ( jy) and P ( jx) is coherent, when regarded as an unconditional upper probability measure 8, 25, 26] .
Of the conditioning rules surveyed in Section 1, only the rules of Zadeh and Nguyen can produce conditional possibility distributions that are unnormalised. Zadeh's rule produces an unnormalised ZA ( jy) whenever (y) < 1. In that case, after we learn that Y = y, the updated possibility distribution ZA ( jy) produces a sure loss since it gives P (X jy) < 1. Indeed the same problem may arise directly from the conditional possibility distribution, without considering the associated possibility measure, as the following example shows. Nguyen's rule, which yields an unnormalised NG ( jy) whenever 0 < (y) < 1, has similar defects.
Rules such as Zadeh's and Nguyen's, which may produce unnormalised conditional possibility distributions, are therefore unreasonable under a behavioural interpretation, and we will assume normality in the rest of this paper. Any such rule can be easily modi ed to normalise ( jy), by dividing by the largest value maxf (xjy): x 2 Xg. For example, normalising Zadeh's rule produces the modi ed rule (xjy) = (x; y)= (y) whenever (y) > 0, which agrees with Dempster's rule, and we will see that this avoids the problems illustrated in the previous example. 4. General consistency criteria We now examine whether a conditioning rule produces conditional possibilities (xjy) that are consistent or`coherent' with the unconditional joint possibilities (x; y). The joint and conditional possibility distributions, ( ; ) and ( jy), generate upper probability measures P and P ( jy) through the formulae in Section 1, so we need to consider whether P and P ( jy) are coherent under a behavioural interpretation. A conditioning rule should specify ( jy) for every possible value of y, so we should look at consistency of the set fP ( jy): y 2 Yg with P. We will consider two problems. Problem 1. Normal possibility distributions ( ; ) and ( jy) are de ned for all y 2 Y. Hence P(A) and P (Bjy) are de ned for all A X Y, B X and y 2 Y, and P and P ( jy) are normal possibility measures (for all y in Y). Problem 2. Normal possibility distributions ( ; ), ( jy) and ( jx) are de ned for all y 2 Y and x 2 X. Hence, in addition to the quantities speci ed in Problem 1, P (Cjx) is de ned for all C Y and x 2 X, and P ( jx) is a normal possibility measure for all x in X.
To motivate Problem 2, note that we can use a conditioning rule to condition on x just as well as on y, and there are many problems in which we would want to calculate both conditional distributions ( jx) and ( jy) from the joint distribution ( ; ).
What do we mean by`consistency'? We introduce two properties, called`avoiding sure loss' and coherence', which are closely related to the behavioural interpretation of upper probability. (4) If this fails, the joint and conditional possibility distributions are inconsistent in the strong sense that they would lead us to accept gambles which are certain to produce an overall loss.
Turning now to Problem 2, we strengthen condition (4) For both Problems 1 and 2, avoiding sure loss can be characterised in terms of probability measures, as follows.
Theorem 1. With the earlier assumptions of Problems 1 and 2, 1. P and fP ( jy): y 2 Yg avoid sure loss if and only if there are probability measures P (de ned on the power set of X Y) and fP( jy): y 2 Yg (each de ned on the power set of X) such that (a) P(A) P(A) = maxf (x; y): (x; y) 2 Ag whenever A X Y, (b) P(Bjy) P (Bjy) = maxf (xjy): x 2 Bg whenever B X, y 2 Y, (c) for all y 2 Y, P and P( jy) satisfy Bayes' rule, i.e. P(Bjy) = P(B fyg)=P(X fyg) whenever the denominator is non-zero, for all B X; 2. P, fP ( jy): y 2 Yg and fP ( jx): x 2 Xg avoid sure loss if and only if there are probability measures P and fP( jy): y 2 Yg satisfying all the conditions of 1, and probability measures fP( jx): x 2 Xg (each de ned on the power set of Y) such that (d) P (Cjx) P (Cjx) = maxf (yjx): y 2 Cg whenever C Y, x 2 X, (e) P and P( jx) satisfy Bayes' rule for all x 2 X. Conditions (c) and (e) (Bayes' rule) are vacuous when P(X fyg) = 0 or P(fxg Y) = 0; in these cases (c) and (e) put no constraints whatsoever on the conditional probabilities P( jy) and P( jx). This is especially important when P is a possibility measure, since there are many joint probability measures P which satisfy (a) and have P(X fyg) = 0 or P(fxg Y) = 0 for most values of y or x. Indeed (x 1 ; y 1 ) = 1 for some (x 1 ; y 1 ) 2 X Y, so the degenerate probability mass function de ned by P(x 1 ; y 1 ) = 1 and P(x; y) = 0 if (x; y) 6 = (x 1 ; y 1 ) will satisfy (a) and have P(X fyg) = P(fxg Y) = 0 whenever x 6 = x 1 and y 6 = y 1 . Then conditions (c) and (e) become vacuous except when y = y 1 or x = x 1 , and it is easy to nd conditional probabilities P( jy) and P( jx) that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1. This means that, as we will now verify, it is very easy for a conditioning rule to avoid sure loss.
Any rule for de ning conditional possibilities which satis es the simple condition (6) in the next theorem must avoid sure loss. This condition is satis ed by all the conditioning rules that we consider in this paper, and indeed it is hard to imagine anyone advocating a rule which violates the condition 5 .
Theorem 2. Suppose that the conditioning rule satis es (8(x; y) 2 X Y)( (x; y) = 1 ) (xjy) = 1) If there is such a positive linear combination of marginally acceptable gambles that is uniformly smaller than G(A), then the overall e ect of this combination of gambles is that we bet against A at a rate smaller than P(A). This is inconsistent with our interpretation of P(A) as an in mum acceptable betting rate, and in this case we say that the model is incoherent. A second type of incoherence can occur when a positive linear combination of marginally acceptable gambles is uniformly smaller than G(Bjy). These two types of incoherence indicate that the conditional possibility distributions ( jy) are inconsistent with the joint distribution ( ; ). The formal de nition of coherence is as follows. We say that P and fP ( If condition (i) fails, the upper probability P(A o ) can be reduced, in e ect, by using the information on the left-hand side of (7) which is provided by the joint and conditional possibility distributions. If (ii) fails, the conditional upper probability P (B o jv o ) can be reduced in a similar way. In both cases the collection of joint and conditional possibility distributions is inconsistent. Remark 1. These two types of incoherence have quite di erent signi cance in the problems studied in this paper, as we assume that the joint distribution ( ; ) is given or xed, and we want to de ne ( jy) in terms of ( ; ) using a conditioning rule. If condition (ii) failed, we could use it to obtain a more informative (i.e. smaller) value of P (B o jv o ), and thus we could use it to correct or improve the conditioning rule. But if condition (i) fails, we must modify the joint distribution, which is assumed to be xed, rather than the conditional ones. So failure of condition (i) seems in this problem to be a`worse' or less constructive type of incoherence than failure of (ii). Unfortunately, for the rules we consider, it is (i) that fails rather than (ii). That can be partly explained by the following remark. Remark 2. Although the coherence conditions (i) and (ii) appear to be quite similar, condition (ii) is almost trivial in the present problem. In fact (ii) holds provided that the conditioning rule satis es (6) and there is y 1 . The stronger concept of coherence appears to be a reasonable consistency requirement, but it is more complicated than the weaker concept studied in this paper. As the conditioning rules that have been proposed previously violate even the weaker property of coherence, we will not study the stronger concept in this paper.
The preceding de nition of coherence can be extended in a straightforward way to Problem 2 by adding terms P C Y (C; x) P (Cjx) ? I C (y)] to the left-hand sides of (7) and (8), to allow an arbitrary positive linear combination of marginally acceptable gambles G(Cjx), and adding a third condition, analogous to (ii), that requires consistency of P (C o ju o ) with the other quantities, where C o Y, u o 2 X.
Avoiding sure loss and coherence can be veri ed in general by using linear programming techniques to solve a nite system of linear inequalities. Alternatively one can solve the dual linear program; see Theorem 3 below, or (more simply) Lemmas 2 and 3 of the Appendix. In Problem 1, coherence can be veri ed directly from Theorem 4, without using linear programming.
Coherence can be characterised in terms of probability measures, by strengthening the characterisation of avoiding sure loss given in Theorem 1. Whereas avoiding sure loss is equivalent to the existence of probability measures that are dominated by P and P ( jy) and related by Bayes' rule, coherence is equivalent to P and P ( jy) being upper envelopes of probability measures that are related by Bayes' rule. We say that P is the upper envelope of a set of probability measures fP : 2 ?g when P(A) = supfP (A): 2 ?g for all sets A in the domain of P. All the conditioning rules we consider start with a normal joint possibility distribution ( ; ) and produce conditional possibility distributions ( jy), y 2 Y, and ( jx), x 
where R + is the set of non-negative real numbers and 0 otherwise: In (9), the quantity in the rst square brackets is the reward from a bet against the event that the outcome (x; y) has degree of possibility no greater than (u; v). The quantity in the second square brackets is the reward from a similar bet made after observing y. So the left-hand side of (9) is a weighted non-negative combination of unconditional bets and bets conditional on y. The condition says that there is a possible outcome (x; y) for which the net reward is non-negative.
The same observations can be made for the coherence conditions (7) A similar characterisation can be given for coherence in Problem 2, only now with the additional term P z2Y (x; z) (zjx) ? (y; zjx)] appearing in the left-hand sides, where is any function from X Y to R + , and a third condition analogous to (ii) but with the right-hand side of (11) In both (10) and (11), the left-hand side is the same weighted combination of bets that appears in (9).
The right-hand side in (10) The inequalities (12) and (13) can be derived directly from (7) and (8) in the de nition of coherence (see the proof of Theorem 4 in the Appendix). However, it is more insightful to consider the betting arguments that lead to these inequalities, as these demonstrate the way in which violation of (12) or (13) produces inconsistency. First consider a bet against fyg, with stake (xjy), at the marginally acceptable betting rate (y). The net reward from this bet is (xjy) (y) ? I X fyg ]. Consider also a marginally acceptable bet against fxg conditional on y, with stake 1, at betting rate (xjy). This has reward I X fyg (xjy) ? I fxg Y ]. When the two bets are combined, the overall reward is the sum (xjy) (y) ? I X fyg I fxg Y = (xjy) (y) ? I f(x;y)g , which is the reward from a bet against f(x; y)g at betting rate (xjy) (y). Because (x; y) is interpreted as an in mum acceptable betting rate, it is necessary for coherence that (x; y) (xjy) (y), which implies (12) .
A similar argument can be used to establish (13) . Consider marginally acceptable bets against f(x; y)g, with stake 1 ? (xjy) and betting rate (x; y), and against f(x; y)g X cofyg, with stake (xjy) and betting rate P(f(x; y)g X cofyg) = maxf (u; v): (u; v) = (x; y) or v 6 = yg = maxf (x; y); (y)g. Writing I f(x;y)g X cofyg = I f(x;y)g +1?I X fyg and c = (x; y)? (xjy) (x; y)+1?maxf (x; y); (y)g], the overall reward from the two bets is 1 ? (xjy)] (x; y) ? I f(x;y)g ] + (xjy) maxf (x; y); (y)g ? I f(x;y)g X cofyg ] = I X fyg (xjy) ? I fxg Y ] + c. This is the reward from a marginally acceptable bet against fxg conditional on y, plus the constant reward c. Because (xjy) is interpreted as an in mum acceptable betting rate, it is necessary for coherence that c 0, which implies (13).
Failure of (12) means that, by combining marginally acceptable gambles, we can be forced to bet against f(x; y)g at a rate (xjy) (y) that is lower than the asserted in mum rate (x; y). Similarly, failure of (13) means that we can be forced to bet against fxg conditional on y at a rate that is lower than the asserted in mum rate (xjy).
The conditional possibilities produced by the Dubois-Prade rule are related to those produced by Dempster's rule and natural extension by DP (xjy) DE (xjy) NE (xjy) for all x 2 X and y 2 Y. It follows from (12) that the Dubois-Prade rule is incoherent whenever DP (xjy) < DE (xjy), which happens whenever 0 < (x; y) < (y) < 1. Formally, the Dubois-Prade rule violates coherence condition (7) In 10, 12, 13, 14], Dubois and Prade propose a de nition of conditional possibilities for events A and B: P DP (AjB) = P(A \ B) if P(A \ B) < P(B) and P DP (AjB) = 1 if P(A \ B) = P(B). The preceding argument shows that the quantities P DP (AjB), P(A \ B) and P(B) are incoherent whenever 0 < P(A \ B) < P(B) < 1.
So the Dubois-Prade rule is not coherent even in the simpler Problem 1. It will therefore not be coherent in Problem 2 either. It also has other defects, especially that it is discontinuous as (x; y) ! (y). For example, if X = fx 1 ; x 2 g, (x 1 ; y) = 10 ?6 and (x 2 ; y) = (1 ? ")10 ?6 , where " > 0, then DP (x 1 jy) = 1 and DP (x 2 jy) = (1 ? ")10 ?6 ! 10 ?6 as " ! 0. This seems absurd. To be fair to Dubois and Prade, it must be pointed out that they proposed their conditioning rule in an ordinal version of possibility theory, where possibility values are not restricted to the unit interval but may belong to an arbitrary chain, and they did not consider the rule in a numerical context. In the ordinal version, discontinuity and incoherence are not applicable. Nevertheless, our arguments indicate that the Dubois-Prade rule should not be used in the numerical version of possibility theory.
Similarly we can see that the renormalised versions of all the solutions to Hisdal's equation are incoherent, except for the extreme case of Dempster's rule. The argument showing incoherence of the Dubois-Prade rule shows that a renormalised Hisdal rule is incoherent whenever (xjy) < (x; y)= (y) for some (x; y), which happens whenever there are (x; y) such that 0 < (x; y) < (y) < (y) 1.
An argument similar to that for the Dubois-Prade rule shows that Ramer's rule is incoherent in Problem 1 (and a fortiori in Problem 2). For any y 2 Y, it yields values RA (xjy) which are incoherent with ( ; ) whenever 0 < (x; y) < (y) < 1. It will also be incoherent if 0 < (x; y) = (y) < 1, provided that there is another x o in X such that (x o ; y) = (y) and we have assigned the value 1 to RA (x o jy) and not to RA (xjy).
The conditioning rules of Zadeh and Nguyen, which can produce unnormalised conditional distributions but which do avoid sure loss in general, are also incoherent in Problem 1. Zadeh's rule violates condition (12) whenever (x; y) > 0 and (y) < 1. Nguyen's rule violates (12) whenever (x; y) > 0 and minf (x); (y)g < 1.
We have shown that conditions (12) and (13) Remark 3. It is remarkable that the coherence conditions (7) and (8), which appear to impose complicated relationships between the possibility distributions ( ; ) and f ( jy): y 2 Yg, are actually equivalent to the simple bounds (12) and (13) . Since the possible (coherent) values of (xjy) depend only on (x; y), (y) and (y), the values of (xjy) and (ujv) can be chosen independently when (u; v) 6 = (x; y); coherence does not impose any relationship between them, except through ( ; ). These simple results do not extend to Problem 2, where the coherence relationships, e.g. (15) and (16) to be any normal possibility distribution without a ecting coherence. This indeterminacy mirrors the indeterminacy of conditional probabilities P( jy) in classical probability theory when P(X fyg) = 0. The case (y) = 0 appears to have no practical importance, at least when Y is nite, because the event C = fy 2 Y : (y) = 0g is`practically impossible' in the sense that we should be willing to bet against its occurrence at any odds, since P(C) = 0. But if C does not occur then the conditional distributions ( jy) for which (y) = 0 will have no e ect on behaviour; the corresponding bets will always be called o . Notice also that if (y) = 0 then (x; y) = 0 for all x 2 X and there is no useful information in the joint possibility distribution ( ; ) from which ( jy) can be constructed. It is therefore not surprising that ( jy) can be chosen arbitrarily. Remark 6. Theorem 4 establishes that Dempster's rule is coherent in Problem 1. However, this result relies on P being a possibility measure. It is well known that if P is a more general type of upper probability measure (such as a plausibility function) and P ( jy) is de ned by Dempster's rule P (Bjy) = P(B fyg)=P(X fyg), then P and fP ( 
Coherence in Problem 2
Of the conditioning rules surveyed in the Introduction, essentially only four are coherent in Problem 1: Dempster's rule (and some of its transforms), natural extension, regular extension and the harmonic mean rule. In this section we investigate which of these rules are coherent also in Problem 2, when they are used to de ne both f ( jx): x 2 Xg and f ( jy): y 2 Yg. Since coherence is a stronger requirement in Problem 2 than in Problem 1, conditions (12) and (13), and their analogous versions with x and y interchanged, are necessary for coherence in Problem 2. The following three inequalities, which relate the quantities (xjy), (yjx) and (x; y), are also necessary for coherence in Problem 2: (x; y) (xjy) (yjx) maxf (x); (y)g (xjy) + (yjx) ? (xjy) (yjx) ; (14) where 0=0 is taken to be 0; (x; y) (xjy) (yjx) maxf (yju): u 2 cofxgg (xjy) maxf (yju): u 2 cofxgg + (yjx) ? (xjy) (yjx) ; (15) provided the denominator is non-zero; and (x; y) (yjx) (xjy) maxf (xjv): v 2 cofygg (yjx) maxf (xjv): v 2 cofygg + (xjy) ? (yjx) (xjy) ; (16) provided the denominator is non-zero. Conditions (14){(16) are considerably more complicated than (12){ (13), which indicates that the coherence relationships are much more involved in Problem 2 than in Problem 1. (16) is obtained from (15) by interchanging x and y. Although (15) and (16) The three conditions generalise from possibility distributions to coherent upper probabilities, and (14) also generalises from variables to events: if A and B are any two events, it is necessary for coherence of the quantities P (AjB), P (BjA), P(A \ B) and P(A B) that P(A \ B) P (AjB)P (BjA)P (A B) P (AjB) + P (BjA) ? P (AjB)P (BjA) : (17) When the joint upper probability P is a probability measure and the conditional probabilities are de ned by Bayes' rule, (17) is satis ed with equality. Again we will outline the betting arguments that lead to (14) and (15) . (14) holds if (xjy) = 0, since then (x; y) (xjy) (y) = 0 by (12), and similarly if (yjx) = 0. Suppose that (xjy) > 0 and (yjx) > 0. De ne = (xjy) + (yjx) ? (xjy) (yjx) (so > 0), = (yjx)= , = (xjy)= , and = (xjy) (yjx)= . Consider three marginally acceptable gambles: a bet against fxg conditional on y at rate (xjy) with stake ; a bet against fyg conditional on x at rate (yjx) with stake ; and a bet against C = (fxg Y) (X fyg) at rate P(C) = maxf (x); (y)g, with stake . Using the identities I C = I fxg Y + I X fyg ? I f(x;y)g and + ? = 1, the overall reward from the three bets is I X fyg (xjy) ? I fxg Y ] + I fxg Y (yjx) ? I X fyg ] + P(C) ? I C ] = P(C) ? I f(x;y)g . This is the reward from a bet against f(x; y)g at rate P(C) = maxf (x); (y)g. Since (x; y) is the in mum acceptable rate for betting against f(x; y)g, it is necessary for coherence that (x; y) maxf (x); (y)g, which establishes (14) . To derive (17) , replace fxg Y, X fyg, (xjy), (yjx), (x; y) and P(C) in the preceding argument by A, B, P (AjB), P (BjA), P(A \ B) and P(A B) respectively.
(15) can be derived in a similar way by combining marginally acceptable bets against fxg conditional on y, against fyg conditional on x, and against fyg conditional on u for every u in cofxg, with stakes proportional to (yjx), (xjy) maxf (yju): u 2 cofxgg, and (xjy) (yjx) respectively. The derivation of (16) is similar, with x and y interchanged.
The inequalities (12){ (16), and the versions of (12) and (13) (15) and (16) are also violated for (x; y) = (b; d).
The inconsistency can be understood in another way, using the comparative probability relation`is at least as probable as', which we denote by . Corollary 1. With the notation of Theorem 5, let P denote the possibility measure that is generated by ( ; ). Then, for every y in Y, NE ( jy) is the upper envelope of the set of all conditional probability measures P( jy) that are coherent with any probability measure P that is dominated by P. (Here P( jy) and P are coherent if and only if they satisfy Bayes' rule, i.e. P(Bjy) = P(B fyg)=P(X fyg) whenever the denominator is non-zero and B X.) Theorem 5 establishes that there are conditioning rules which are coherent in Problem 2. However, as discussed in Section 1.9, conditioning by natural extension is`almost uninformative' in the sense that NE ( jy) can be non-vacuous for at most one value of y. It is desirable to nd a conditioning rule that is coherent in Problem 2 and typically produces non-vacuous conditional possibility distributions. By Theorem 4, any coherent rule must satisfy: if (x; y) = (y) then (xjy) = 1. The strongest non-vacuity property that is compatible with coherence is the condition: (x; y) < (y) ) (xjy) < 1: (18) It turns out that the harmonic mean rule, which has this property, is coherent in Problem 2. In the numerical examples that we have studied, the conditional possibilities HM (xjy) and HM (yjx) either achieve equality or nearly do so in at least one of the inequalities (14){ (16) for most values of (x; y). By substituting the formulae for HM (xjy) in (14), we nd that the harmonic mean rule achieves equality in (14) whenever any of the following conditions is satis ed: (i) (x; y) = 1; (ii) (x; y) = 0; (iii) (x; y) = (x) > (y); (iv) (x; y) = (y) > (x) ; (v) (x) = (y) < 1; (vi) (y) = (x) < 1; or (vii) (y) = (x) = 1 and (x) = (y). When X and Y each contain two elements, for example, there must be equality in (14) for at least two of the four (x; y) pairs, and if (x 1 ; y 2 ) = (x 2 ; y 1 ) then there must be equality in (14) for all (x; y). For instance, in the numerical Example 3 that was given to illustrate the incoherence of Dempster's rule, the harmonic mean rule produces HM (bjd) = HM (djb) = 2 3 , which achieves equality in (14), (15) and (16). (It is the smallest value that satis es these inequalities.) Thus the harmonic mean rule appears to produce conditional possibilities that are about as small as possible (i.e. as informative as possible) to achieve coherence.
Conclusion
We have investigated the coherence properties of various rules for de ning conditional possibilities. These properties are summarised in Table 1 . The conditional possibility distributions produced by the rules of Zadeh and Nguyen are usually not normal, and they are not reasonable under the behavioural interpretation adopted in this paper. The Dubois-Prade rule, Ramer's rule and the renormalised Hisdal rules avoid sure loss, but they are typically incoherent even in the simpler Problem 1, and they therefore seem unsatisfactory under a behavioural interpretation. Dempster's rule is coherent in Problem 1 but typically not in Problem 2, when it is used to condition on x as well as on y. Table 1 . Coherence properties of the conditioning rules surveyed in this paper. All the rules in the table avoid sure loss in both Problems 1 and 2.
Normality of Coherence in Coherence in
Of the rules examined in this paper, only three are coherent in both problems: natural extension, regular extension and the new harmonic mean rule. Natural extension models the information that is contained in the unconditional possibility distribution ( ; ) concerning conditional possibilities. That is, the conditional betting rates NE (xjy) that are produced by natural extension are the rates that can be constructed, by combining bets, from the unconditional betting rates alone, without providing any additional information. If the aim is to model what can be learned about conditional possibilities from the unconditional possibility distribution alone, then natural extension is the correct conditioning rule. By Theorem 4, any coherent conditional possibility distribution ( jy) must provide at least as much information about conditional betting rates as natural extension. From this point of view, any other coherent conditioning rule is implicitly adding information to that contained in the unconditional possibility distribution.
Unfortunately the natural extension NE ( jy) may be too uninformative to be useful, as NE ( jy) can be non-vacuous for at most one possible value of y. This simply re ects the fact that the unconditional possibility distribution ( ; ) alone supplies very little information, and sometimes none at all, about conditional possibilities. Regular extension is only slightly more informative than natural extension.
If it is necessary to de ne non-vacuous conditional possibilities then either additional information must be supplied or another conditioning rule must be used. Of the alternative rules studied in this paper, the new harmonic mean rule is the most satisfactory. It has the following desirable properties.
(a) It is coherent in both Problems 1 and 2. This is equivalent to condition (I) of Lemma 1, and hence to the existence of a probability measure P which satis es: (i) P(G(A)) = P(A) ? P(A) 0, i.e. P(A) P(A), whenever A X Y; and (ii) P(G(Bjy)) = P(X fyg)P (Bjy) ?P(B fyg) 0, i.e. if P(X fyg) > 0 then P(B fyg)=P(X fyg) P (Bjy), for all B X and y 2 Y.
Thus avoiding sure loss is equivalent to the existence of a P which satis es (i) and (ii). It remains to be proven that this is equivalent to the existence of probability measures which satisfy (a){(c) of Theorem 1.
If probability measures P and fP( jy): y 2 Yg satisfy (a){(c) then P satis es (i), which is identical to (a), and (ii), which follows from (b) and (c) . (Condition (ii) holds when P(X fyg) = 0 since then P(G(Bjy)) = 0.) Conversely, suppose that a probability measure P satis es (i) and (ii). Then P satis es (a) of the Theorem. De ne conditional probability measures P( jy) by P(Bjy) = P(B fyg)=P(X fyg) whenever P(X fyg) > 0, so that (c) is satis ed. Then (b) holds whenever P(X fyg) > 0, by (ii). Because each P ( jy) is a normal possibility measure, it is a coherent upper probability measure, and it follows from Theorem 3.3.3 of 24] that, for each y 2 Y, there is a probability measure P( jy) which satis es (b) . If P(X fyg) = 0 then P( jy) can be taken to be any such probability measure.
Thus ( Given normal possibility measures P and fP ( jy): y 2 Yg, let M 1 denote the set of all probability measures (de ned on the power set of X Y) which satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in the proof of Theorem 1, i.e. M 1 = f P 2 P : P(A) P(A) when A X Y; and P(B fyg) P(X fyg)P (Bjy) when B X; y 2 Y g; where P denotes the set of all probability measures whose domain is the power set of X Y. When P is regarded as a simplex in a nite-dimensional Euclidean space, its subset M 1 , which is the set of solutions for a nite system of weak linear inequalities, is a closed convex polyhedron. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that the given possibility measures avoid sure loss if and only if M 1 is non-empty. The next two lemmas, which lead to Theorem 3, show that the given possibility measures are coherent if and only if they are`upper envelopes' of M 1 , in a sense which is made explicit in Lemma 3.
Similarly, given normal possibility measures P, fP ( Proof. We will prove part 1; the proof of part 2 is completely analogous. First suppose that a non-empty set M satis es (i) and (ii). Then every P 2 M must satisfy the inequalities in the de nition of M 1 , so M M 1 . Hence P(A) = supfP (A): P 2 Mg supfP (A): P 2 M 1 g P(A), which shows that M 1 satis es (i). Similarly M 1 satis es (ii). This proves that there is a set M which satis es (i) and (ii) if and only if M 1 does so. Since M is non-empty, so is M 1 , and the possibility measures avoid sure loss by Theorem 1. Also P(A o ) = supfP (A o ): P 2 M 1 g for any A o X Y, since M 1 satis es (i). Because M 1 is a closed subset of P under the natural topology, the supremum value of P(A o ) is attained on M 1 . Thus there is a probability measure P 2 M 1 such that P(A o ) = P(A o ). By ( ) of Lemma 2, the coherence condition (7) To establish the equality (second part) of (ii), suppose that B X, y 2 Y and P(X cofyg) < 1. By ( ) of Lemma 2, there is P 2 M 1 such that P(B fyg) = P(X fyg)P (Bjy). Since P 2 M 1 , P(X cofyg) P(X cofyg) < 1, so P(X fyg) = 1 ? P(X cofyg) > 0. Hence P(B fyg)=P(X fyg) = P (Bjy), from which the second part of (ii) follows. Thus M 1 satis es (i) and (ii). Remark 7. Lemmas 2 and 3 remain valid when P, fP ( jy): y 2 Yg and fP ( jx): x 2 Xg are general upper probability measures, e.g. possibility measures that are not normal. However, Theorem 3 relies on the assumption that P ( jy) is a coherent upper probability measure (e.g. a normal possibility measure) when P(X cofyg) = 1; this assumption is used in the following proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Again we prove part 1 of the theorem; the proof of part 2 is analogous. First suppose that there are probability measures which satisfy (a){(c) of Theorem 3. Let M = fP : 2 ?g, and verify that M satis es conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3. Clearly (a) implies (i). The rst (inequality) part of (ii) holds because, whenever P (X fyg) > 0, P (B fyg)=P (X fyg) = P (Bjy) P (Bjy), using (c) and (b) . Suppose that P(X cofyg) < 1. Then, as in the proof of Lemma 3, P (X fyg) > 0 for all 2 ?. Applying (b) and (c), P (Bjy) = supfP (Bjy): 2 ?g = supfP (B fyg)=P (X fyg): 2 ?g. This establishes the second (equality) part of (ii). Thus M satis es (i) and (ii). By Lemma 3, P and fP ( jy): y 2 Yg are coherent. Thus (a){(c) are su cient for coherence.
Conversely, suppose that P and fP ( jy): y 2 Yg are coherent. By Lemma 3, the non-empty set M 1 satis es (i) and (ii). Let ? index the probability measures in M 1 , i.e. M 1 = fP : 2 ?g. (As explained below, a single probability measure P 2 M 1 may appear as P with many di erent indices , to cope with the case where P(X fyg) = 0.) For each 2 ? and y 2 Y, de ne conditional probability measures P ( jy) as follows. If P (X fyg) > 0 then de ne P (Bjy) = P (B fyg)=P (X fyg) whenever B X. This ensures that (c) is satis ed. Now consider the case P (X fyg) = 0. By assumption, P ( jy) is a normal possibility measure and therefore a coherent upper probability measure. It follows that P ( jy) can be written as the upper envelope of a nite set of probability measures fP i ( jy): i = 1; 2; : : :; kg, whose cardinality k is no greater than the cardinality of the power set of X. De ne the unconditional probability measure associated with P i ( jy) by P i = P for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. (That is, we include k copies of P in the indexed set of measures, each copy being associated with a di erent conditional probability measure P i ( jy).)
As noted above, (c) holds by de nition of P ( jy) . Finally, verify that conditions (a) and (b) are satis ed. By (i), P is the upper envelope of M 1 = fP : 2 ?g, so (a) holds. If P(X cofyg) < 1 then P (X fyg) > 0 for every 2 ?, so that P (Bjy) = P (B fyg)=P (X fyg), and (b) follows from (ii). If P(X cofyg) = 1 then there is P 2 M 1 with P (X fyg) = 0, by construction P ( jy) is the upper envelope of fP ( jy) : P (X fyg) = 0; 2 ?g, and P ( jy) dominates the upper envelope of fP ( Conversely, suppose that ( ; ) and f ( jy): y 2 Yg satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4. To prove that they are coherent, we will construct a set M of probability measures which satisfy the two conditions of Lemma 3. For each y 2 Y, let x = u(y) maximise (x; y), so that (u(y); y) = (y). Let y 1 2 Y be such that (y 1 ) = 1, and let y 2 2 cofy 1 g maximise (y) over all y 2 cofy 1 g.
Suppose that (x; y) > 0. Then (y) > 0, and (xjy) > 0 by the lower bound in Theorem 4. De ne a probability measure P x;y to have the following probability mass function: P x;y (x; y) = (x; y), P x;y (u(y); y) = (x; y) 1 ? (xjy)]= (xjy) if x 6 = u(y), P x;y (u(y 1 ); y 1 ) = 1 ? (x; y)= (xjy) if y 6 = y 1 , P x;y (u(y 2 ); y 2 ) = 1 ? (x; y 1 )= (xjy 1 ) if y = y 1 and P x;y (u; v) = 0 for all other (u; v) 2 X Y. Then P x;y (u; v) > 0 for at most three pairs (u; v), i.e. for (u; v) = (x; y), (u(y); y) and either (u(y 1 ); y 1 ) or (u(y 2 ); y 2 ). It can be easily veri ed that these probabilities are non-negative, using the lower bound in the theorem to show that (x; y) (xjy), and that they sum to one, using the lower bound again to show that (u(y)jy) = 1. Thus each P x;y is a probability measure. Consider (a). Suppose that (x; y) 2 X Y and (x; y) > 0. It su ces to verify (a) for those (w; z) which have positive probability under P x;y , and therefore we need only to consider (w; z) 2 f(x; y); (u(y); y); (u(y 1 ); y 1 ); (u(y 2 ); y 2 )g. Clearly (a) holds when (w; z) = (u(y 1 ); y 1 ), since (u(y 1 ); y 1 ) = 1. When y 6 = y 1 , we need to consider only (w; z) = (x; y) and (w; z) = (u(y); y): (a) holds in the rst case because P x;y (x; y) = (x; y), and also in the second case because, using the lower bound in the theorem, P x;y (f(x; y); (u(y); y)g) = (x; y)= (xjy) (y) = (u(y); y).
Suppose that y = y 1 . We need to consider only (w; z) = (x; y 1 ) and (w; z) = (u(y 2 ); y 2 ). Using the upper bound for (xjy 1 ) in the theorem, (x; y 1 )= (xjy 1 ) (x; y 1 ) + 1 ? maxf (x; y 1 ); (y 1 )g, where (y 1 ) = (y 2 ) = (u(y 2 ); y 2 ) since y 2 maximises (y) over y 6 = y 1 . (This holds when (y 1 ) = 1 as then (xjy 1 ) 1.) Consequently, P x;y (f(x; y 1 ); (u(y 2 ); y 2 )g) = (x; y 1 ) + 1 ? (x; y 1 )= (xjy 1 ) maxf (x; y 1 ); (u(y 2 ); y 2 )g. Using maxf (x; y 1 ); (y 1 )g (x; y 1 ) + (y 1 ) = (x; y 1 ) + (y 2 ), the rst inequality gives (x; y 1 )= (xjy 1 ) 1 ? (y 2 ), from which it follows that P x;y (u(y 2 ); y 2 ) = 1 ? (x; y 1 )= (xjy 1 ) (y 2 ). Finally, P x;y (x; y) = (x; y). This establishes (a). Thus M satis es (i) of Lemma 3.
Next verify (ii) of Lemma 3. Suppose that (x; y) > 0 and v 2 Y. If P x;y (X fvg) > 0, de ne a conditional probability measure P x;y ( jv) by P x;y (Bjv) = P x;y (B fvg)=P x;y (X fvg) for all B X. We need to prove that P x;y (Bjv) P (Bjv) whenever the left-hand side is de ned.
First consider the case v = y. Then P x;y ( jy) is de ned since P x;y (X fyg) (x; y) > 0. To verify that P x;y (Bjy) P (Bjy), we need only to consider sets B that contain x or u(y), since P x;y (u; y) = 0 for all other values of u. The inequality holds when u(y) 2 B because, using the lower bound in the theorem, P (Bjy) (u(y)jy) (u(y); y)= (y) = 1. It holds also when B contains x but not u(y), because then P x;y (Bjy) = P x;y (fxgjy) = P x;y (x; y)= P x;y (x; y) + P x;y (u(y); y)] = (xjy) = P (fxgjy) P (Bjy) (using the de nition of P x;y ). (This holds when x = u(y), using the lower bound in the theorem, as then all terms are 1.) Thus the inequality holds for v = y.
The remaining cases for which P x;y ( jv) may be de ned are the cases v = y 1 6 = y and v = y 2 6 = y. The inequality holds trivially in these cases because, using the lower bound in the theorem, P (Bjy i ) = Although the terms in one sequence must be distinct, since (u; v) is strictly increasing, one term (u; v) 6 = (x; y) may appear in both sequences. If so, take its probability to be the sum of the two probabilities de ned in the previous paragraph. Then the total probability assigned to the two sequences is (x; There are ve cases to consider, depending on the values of (x; y), (x) , (y), (x) and (y). In each case we complete the de nition of P x;y and outline the four steps of the proof, omitting some details.
Case (i). Assign all the remaining probability 1 ? 1 2 (s 1 ; t 1 ) + (s 2 ; t 2 )] to (q; r), and let P x;y (u; v) = 0 if (u; v) is not in either sequence and (u; v) 6 = (q; r). (If possible, take (q; r) to be the termination point of either sequence.) (b) Let (w; z) 2 X Y and A(w; z) = f(u; v): (u; v) (w; z)g. We need to show that P x;y (A(w; z)) (w; z). This obviously holds if (w; z) = 1. If (u; v) (x; y) and (u; v) 6 = (x; y) then P x;y (u; v) = 0 because (u; v) cannot belong to either sequence. Hence, if (w; z) (x; y) and (w; z) 6 = (x; y) then P x;y (A(w; z)) = 0 (w; z). If (w; z) = (x; y) then P x;y (A(w; z)) = (w; z).
Finally, if (x; y) (w; z) < 1 then P x;y (A(w; z)) = (x; y)+ P P x;y (u; v), where the summation is over all terms (u; v) in the two sequences for which (x; y) < (u; v) (z; w). Let (w 1 ; z 1 ) and (w 2 ; z 2 ) denote the last terms in each sequence for which (w i ; z i ) (w; z). Then because case (i) is symmetric between X and Y.) We need to verify that, if we de ne the conditional probabilities by Bayes' rule, then P x;y (Bjv) P (Bjv) whenever B X. From the construction of P x;y , there are at most three elements u in X such that P x;y (u; v) > 0, and one of these (denoted by w) must achieve (w; v) = (v). The result is trivial when w 2 B, since then P (Bjv) = HM (wjv) =
1.
Hence we need to verify the result only when B contains one or two elements u such that (u; v) < (w; v) = (v) and P x;y (u; v) > 0. In that case (u; v) must appear in one of the sequences and must be followed by (w; v), so that P x;y (w; v) 1 2 (w; v) ? (u; v)] = 1 2 (v) ? (u; v)]. If (u; v) 6 = (x; y) then P x;y (u; v) 1 2 (u; v), hence (using Bayes' rule) P x;y (ujv) = P x;y (u; v)=P x;y (v) P x;y (u; v)= P x;y (u; v)+P x;y (w; v)] (u; v)= (u; v)+ (v)? (u; v)] = (u; v)= (v) HM (ujv) = P (fugjv). If (u; v) = (x; y) then P x;y (x; y) = (x; y), hence P x;y (xjy) = P x;y (x; y)=P x;y (y) P x;y (x; y)= P x;y (x; y) + P x;y (w; y)] 2 (x; y)= (y) + (x; y)] = HM (xjy) = P (fxgjy), using the fact that (y) = 1. This establishes the result when B contains only one element.
Finally consider B = fu; u 0 g, where both (u; v) and (u 0 ; v) have positive probability under P x;y , (u; v) < (w; v) = (v) and similarly for u 0 . Then (u; v) and (u 0 ; v) must appear in di erent sequences, and each must be followed by (w; v). Hence (d) This holds trivially in case (i) because (y) = (x) = 1. However, the de nition of P x;y in case (i) can easily be modi ed to ensure that P x;y (xjy) = HM (xjy) and P x;y (yjx) = HM (yjx), as follows. If (x; y) = (y) then P x;y (xjy) = 1 = HM (xjy). Otherwise, (x; y) is followed in the rst sequence by (w; y) where (w; y) = (y) > (x; y). Provided that (w; y) does not occur also in the second sequence, P x;y (w; y) = 1 2 (y) ? (x; y)], which gives P x;y (xjy) = P x;y (x; y)= P x;y (x; y)+ P x;y (w; y)] = 2 (x; y)= (y) + (x; y)] = HM (xjy). If (w; y) does occur in the second sequence then it is necessary to reduce the value of P x;y (w; y) by 1 2 (y) ? (u; v)], where (u; v) is the last term in the second sequence which precedes (w; y) and has v 6 = y, to ensure that P x;y (X fyg) = 1 2 (y) + (x; y)]. (The probability that is subtracted can be added to P x;y (q; r).) Similarly, if (x; z) = (x) > (x; y) and (x; z) occurs in the rst sequence, then reduce P x;y (x; z) so that P x;y (fxg Y) = 1 2 (x) + (x; y)]. Property (b) still holds when P x;y is modi ed in this way, because reducing P x;y (w; y) or P x;y (x; z) cannot increase P x;y (A(u; v)) when (u; v) < 1, and it can be veri ed that property (c) is satis ed.
Case (ii). (y) = 1 and (x; y) < (y).
(a) In this case the de nition of P x;y is more complicated. Note rst that (x) = 1, because (x; y) < (y) = 1. De ne probabilities P x;y on the two sequences as before. Here the rst sequence must terminate at (u 2 ; y) since (u 2 ; y) = (y) = 1. Let (s; t) be the last term in the second sequence such that t 6 = y, or take (s; t) = (x; y) if there is no such term (i.e. if (x; y) = (x)). (There may be other terms (s; y) and (u 2 ; y) which follow (s; t) in the second sequence and have positive probability.) Let (q; r) achieve (y), i.e. (q; r) = (y) = (r) and r 6 = y. Assign additional probability 1 2 (y) ? (s; t)] to (q; r); this is non-zero only if (q; r) 6 = (s; t). If (q; r) < (q; y) and q 6 = u 2 then assign additional probability 1 2 (q; y) ? (y)] to (q; y). (In this case q 6 = x.) Finally, modify P x;y (u 2 ; y) so that the total probability under P x;y is 1.
The total probability assigned to the second sequence up to and including (s; t) is 1 2 (s; t) + (x; y)], and therefore P x;y (u 2 ; y) = (x) ? (x; y)] = 1 2 (x) + (x; y)]. (b) We need to show that P x;y (A(w; z)) (w; z), where A(w; z) = f(u; v): (u; v) (w; z)g. As in case (i), this holds when (w; z) belongs to the second sequence, up to and including (s; t). The only other cases that need to be veri ed are those with (w; z) = (q; r), (q; y) or (s; y), and the veri cation is straightforward because the probability of each term contains a factor of 1 2 . For example, if (q; r) < (q; y) < (s; y) < 1 then P x;y (A(q; r)) = 1 2 (y) + (x; y)] (y) = (q; r), P x;y (A(q; y)) = 1 2 (q; y) + (x; y)] (q; y), and P x;y (A(s; y)) = 1 2 (q; y) + (x; y) + (s; y) ? (s; t)] 1 2 (q; y) + (s; y)] (s; y). and HM (sjy) HM (xjy), since (q; y) (x; y) and (s; y) (x; y). From these expressions it is straightforward to verify that P x;y (Bjy) maxf HM (ujy): u 2 Bg = P (Bjy) when B is any subset of fx; q; sg. This inequality holds trivially when u 2 2 B since then P (Bjy) = HM (u 2 jy) = 1.
Next consider conditioning on u 2 X. By essentially the same argument as in case (i)(c), the required inequality holds for u = q and for all u which appear in the second sequence, except possibly for u = x and u = u 2 . Suppose that u = x. Then P x;y (x; v) > 0 only when v = y or v = v 2 , where (x; v 2 ) = (x). Also P x;y (x; y) = (x; y) and P x;y (fxg Y) = 1 2 (x) + (x; y)]. By Bayes' rule, P x;y (yjx) = P x;y (x; y)=P x;y (fxg Y) = 2 (x; y)= (x)+ (x; y)] = HM (yjx), using the fact that (x) = 1 in case (ii). Also P x;y (v 2 jx) 1 = HM (v 2 jx) since (x; v 2 ) = (x). Thus (c) is veri ed for u = x.
Finally, suppose that u = u 2 . Now P x;y (u 2 ; v) > 0 only when v = y or v = r (if q = u 2 ) or v = t (if s = u 2 ). It is straightforward to verify that P x;y (rju 2 ) (y) = (u 2 ; r) HM (rju 2 ) when q = u 2 ; P x;y (tju 2 ) (u 2 ; t) HM (tju 2 ) when s = u 2 ; and P x;y (fr; tgju 2 ) (y) HM (rju 2 ) maxf HM (rju 2 ); HM (tju 2 )g = P (fr; tgju 2 ) when q = s = u 2 . This establishes (c). This is analogous to case (ii), with x and y interchanged.
Case (iv). (x; y) (y).
(a) Note rst that (y) = 1, because (y) (x; y) (y) and maxf (y); )y)g = 1, and (x; y) = (x), because (x; y) (y) (x; v) when v 6 = y. It follows that the two sequences de ned earlier are very simple: the rst sequence terminates at (u 2 ; y), where (u 2 ; y) = (y) = 1, and the second sequence terminates at (x; y). The probability measure P x;y is de ned by P x;y (x; y) = (x; y), P x;y (u 2 ; y) = 1 ? (x; y) if u 2 6 = x, and P x;y (u; v) = 0 for all other (u; v) 2 X Y. (b) This holds because P x;y (A(w; z)) = 0 if (w; z) < (x; y), P x;y (A(w; z)) = (x; y) if (x; y) (w; z) < 1, and (w; z) = 1 otherwise, and in each case P x;y (A(w; z)) (w; z). (c) This needs to be veri ed only for v = y, u = x and u = u 2 , as only these values have positive probability under P x;y . Here HM (yjx) = HM (yju 2 ) = HM (u 2 jy) = 1, since (x; y) = (x) and (u 2 ; y) = (u 2 ) = (y) = 1. Also P x;y (xjy) = (x; y) = HM (xjy). Hence the required inequality holds in each case.
(d) P x;y (yjx) = 1 = HM (yjx), and P x;y (xjy) = (x; y) = HM (xjy), as required.
Case (v). (x; y) (x).
This case is analogous to case (iv).
Note that cases (i){(v) do cover all possibilities. If neither (ii) nor (iv) holds then (y) < 1, and if neither (iii) nor (v) holds then (x) < 1. Hence, if none of (ii){(v) holds then (x) < 1 and (y) < 1, so that (i) holds.
